Anthony Cordesman Quotations

Ulster (Northern Ireland) and the Balkans have already shown how difficult it is to split cities, and with Iraq's centralized and failing infrastructure, and impoverished economy, violence and economics cannot be separated.

The problem with the speeches is they get gradually more realistic, but they are still exercises in spin. They don't outline the risks. They don't create a climate where people trust what's being said.

The reality is that if the Shi'ites and Kurds can be inclusive and if they can reach a settlement with most of the Iraqi Sunnis, then the efforts of U.S. and coalition forces and the growing Iraqi forces are almost certain to be successful,

The real issue is that they have a very large booster under development.

Serving soldiers develop a tremendous sense of obligation to their comrades, and are trained to see the mission through. They know the military and the risk, and they have already chosen to serve their country.

On a day-to-day basis, the overall level of security is obviously low. We can't secure the airport road, can't stop the incoming into the Green Zone, can't stop the killings and kidnappings,

Obviously every time you get a weakening of the coalition, it highlights the lack of international support for the U.S. mission.

I would call it a show of words.

He has studied military tactics and counterinsurgency operations, but I don't think this is someone who sees himself as a commander. This is someone who sees himself as a stimulator.

Having a country stay in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty that effectively is proceeding to defy it doesn't necessarily strengthen the treaty.

That doesn't mean the potential should be minimized. We know these states can achieve technical surprise.

will end in snatching defeat from the jaws of uncertainty.

You can both vote and hold a rifle.

We essentially used a bull to liberate a china shop.

You are dealing with an unproven prime minister. It's the beginning of a very contentious process. It's very unlikely that all of these issues are going to get resolved by the end of the year.

Usually they'll place an array of explosives locked to a single infrared sensor, ... What you get is an array of shaped charges, so you're not going to get hit with just one.

We need to understand that this is a warning, ... Over the next few months we're going to see a referendum on a constitution that's going to trigger more debates on Shiite identity ... The idea that the constitution or referendum is going to clear this up is unrealistic.

The problem is people don't live on economic statistics.

We don't know how many leaders there are, how many experienced cadres there are, how many replacements there are.

We did not plan three years ago to create more than token Iraqi forces. Now we're at 230,000 roughly and counting. Our whole strategy is dependent on the success of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police.

This was a largely punitive operation. It did not cripple any of Saddam's capabilities.

Everything I know about counterterrorism is, you deal with specific cells.

Even if the constitution clearly wins acceptance by most Shiites and Kurds and some Sunnis, this is only the start of a process, not the end. Even the best outcome of the vote is the prelude to months and years of additional effort.

And to be perfectly blunt, I think only fools would bet the lives of other men's sons and daughters on their own arrogance and call this force a cakewalk or a speed bump or something that you can dismiss.

There's so much spin in these numbers. A lot of facts get disguised. . . . Total manpower is meaningless. The army is the key force in direct combat.

These are scarcely people you want to integrate into a national force. This would simply create sectarian or ethnic forces or divisions within the forces that already exist.

You're watching the insurgents develop more sophisticated methods of attack, and more sophisticated IEDs. They're using shaped charges and anti-tank mines stacked together. They're using 500-pound bombs that can destroy any armored vehicle. They're using these so-called swarming attacks, firing several RPG rounds at one lightly armored vehicle.

This is the first step to allow Iraq to have a unity government, but it's only a first step. The question is, will the new prime minister be capable of leading the country?

The (United States) needs to stop issuing such nonsense as soon as possible. They have so little credibility that they can breed nothing but further distrust.

America and its allies face many risks and problems in Iraq, but it is all too easy to snatch defeat from the jaws of uncertainty.

They have begun to realize that when you focus only on the U.S. it gives the impression that the U.S. doesn't care about Iraqis.

The Yemeni central government has done what it can, but it is very weak. It is not a matter of the government not trying. But there are limits to it can do.

It's 50-50 this thing holds together through the spring of 2006. But that is purely a guess.

It's almost a creeping polarization of Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines, We see a slow, steady loss of confidence, a growing process of distrust.

It's going to be 'Let's Make a Deal. The important thing in some ways was that there was a large vote. The concerns that it would fall along ethnic and sectarian lines were validated.

The best thing we can do is to make sure that our training helps them to create truly national military forces and truly national police forces because that then takes away any sense that one needs militias to provide security.

It's an essential part of the broader strategy. But you won't have a situation where Iraqi battalions come on line and U.S. troops leave the next week.

It's an essential part of the broader strategy.

If you pull troops out too quickly now, and you see the situation in Iraq collapse before the midterm elections, the impact is going to be far more serious than if you keep the troops in at reasonable levels.

If you pull out troops too quickly now, and you see the situation in Iraq collapse before the midterm elections, the impact is going to be far more serious than if you keep the troops in at reasonable levels.

Iraq might be a far easier opponent than its force strengths indicate. But it also is potentially a very serious military opponent indeed,

How much of the battle space can the Iraqi forces take over, and who is actually doing the fighting - those are the key measurements. The measure cannot be the elimination of the insurgency, as desirable as that would be. You cannot eliminate all of the bombings.

And internally, it again raises the problem that rather than seeing an international force, Iraqis always see U.S. troops. And that raises all kinds of questions about whether the U.S. will leave.